Trying
to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of
Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives
in midstream, engaging in "mission creep" and would have incurred
incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably
impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama which we knew
intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect,
rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting
it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances,
there was no viable "exit strategy" we could see, violating
another of our principles. Further more, we had been self-consciously
trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-Cold War
world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the
United Nations' mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international
response to aggression that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion
route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power
in bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different
-- and perhaps barren -- outcome.
--
George H.W. Bush in A World Transformed