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Times of London -- Iraq Memo -- NY Times???
A BUZZFLASH GUEST CONTRIBUTION
by Jim Pittman
BuzzFlash Reader Jim Pittman has tried to bring to the attention
of The New York Times the "smoking gun" memo published
last week in Britain which provides concrete evidence that the US'
and Britain's stated reasons for invading Iraq were a deception. This
memo recounts a discussion between American and British intelligence
officials, eight months prior to the invasion, concerning a strategy
to justify the invasion they desired. No government officials have
disputed the authenticity of the memo to our knowledge. Eighty-eight
members of congress have signed and sent a
letter to President Bush asking for answers. To date, The
New York Times has run one article alluding to the memo, ("For
Blair, Iraq Issue Just Won't Go Away"), published May 1 on page
9. The story's focus is Blair's attempt to deflect criticism of his
foreign policy prior to last Friday's election. The New York
Times has not published the Downing Street memo.
The letter below was addressed to NY Times Executive
Editor Bill Keller.
Dear Mr Keller,
I just spoke with your secretary, who says nobody has seen the
minutes wherein Blair's Intelligence Chief reported that Bush,
in July of 2002, had already decided on war with Iraq no matter
what and that "... the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy." Let that sink in. "... the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
How do you define High Treason? Would that include, oh, subverting
the Constitution? Waging a war under false pretenses? Maybe lying
under oath? Your paper sure was shocked, just shocked, at Clinton's
lies. Is one semen-stained dress important, but 30,000 blood-stained
American uniforms of no real consequence?
We need this story, above-the-fold, day after day, in all its
details (remember Clarke, O'Neill, the October 2000 PNAC "global-dominance
through war paper," all the testimony that Bush wanted Iraq,
the "evidence" based on drunks and forged documents
etc. etc). Cover it or watch your sales hit the trash-can, if
appeals to honor and defense of America carry no weight with you
or your paper.
Here's the link and the full text of the Downing Street minutes:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
The secret Downing Street memo SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL
- UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195
/02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General,
Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C,
Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to
discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should
be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need
to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only
way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action.
Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and
land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up
with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor.
Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly
based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable.
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified
by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no
patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing
material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion
in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a
short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from
the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60
days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli.
Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even
earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in
Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and
other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three
main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps
with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey,
tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes
of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions
had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US
minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline
beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin
Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his
mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his
neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya,
North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum
to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would
also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change
was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible
legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in
this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN
inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that
it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different
strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political
context were right, people would support regime change. The
two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether
we had the political strategy to give the military plan the
space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD
on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting
began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait.
Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with
a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy.
On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political
strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance,
we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue
to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors
back in only when he thought the threat of military action was
real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted
UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early.
He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going
down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime
Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take
part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture
of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS
should tell the US military that we were considering a range
of options. (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question
of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of
the week. (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister
the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up
the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions
of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key
EU member states. (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister
a full intelligence update. (f) We must not ignore the legal
issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy
aide)
[end text]
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