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One More Week This Year to Help the Voter Confidence Act, HR2239

A BUZZFLASH READER COMMENTARY

Dear BuzzFlash,

One more week this year to help the Voter Confidence Act, HR2239

DECEMBER 2nd - 8th IS HR2239 WEEK!!! - (Go to http://www.verifiedvoting.org for action info)

See the New York Times editorial:
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/1202-02.htm

One more week this year until the Congressional session is over (probably).
One more week this year to make a huge difference.
One more week this year to call Representatives at 1-800-839-5276 and urge support.
Start today.

We have 84 co-sponsors, including three Republicans. We know of at least one, maybe as many as 10 more, who have signed on but haven't shown up on the Thomas site yet. We've all had a short break, so, let's dig in one more time this year and get more Representatives on board with the goal of fair elections.

Call your Representative and 4 others today.
Call 2 more every day this week.
Call your Senators and ask for a companion bill.

Do it, do it, do it!!

* * *

RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS AND QUESTIONS OF LEGISLATORS

These comments, based on the text of H.R. 2239, address concerns expressed by members of the United States Congress.

* I am concerned about the additional costs of implementing H.R. 2239.

Most districts are NOT currently using touch-screen equipment. These districts can use future HAVA funds to upgrade to systems that provide a voter verifiable paper trail. If the cost of adding voter-verifiable printers to touch screens is too great, precinct-based optical scan systems can be purchased at about 1/3 of the price of touch screen systems -- and, according to many studies, these systems are at least as accurate as touch screens.

Districts currently using touch screens can upgrade by adding voter-verifiable printers. If this is too costly in the short run, such districts almost invariably have high-volume optical scan systems available for absentee voting. These paper ballots can be used in polling places as well as absentee. These systems are proven and widely used (and, of course, certified for use).

* I am concerned about the shortened timeline in H.R.2239.

Every district can meet the HR 2239 deadlines. If new equipment is not ready by November 2004, counties can continue to use paper-based systems. Note that most counties have absentee voting systems based on paper ballots.

* I am concerned about states' rights.

It is within the province of the federal government to regulate the voting methods for federal elections, such as the Presidential election. H.R.2239 does not mandate more regulation of the states than HAVA does; it simply mandates somewhat different regulation.

* The requirement for a paper receipt opens the door to fraud.

There are no "receipts." H.R. 2239 mandates paper records that are left in a secure container in the polling place, like conventional paper ballots. The voters cannot take a copy of their votes away from the polling place. These records would enable MEANINGFUL recounts, rather than simple repetition of the machine tallies.

* What about the voting privacy of individuals with disabilities?

H.R. 2239 does not reduce the privacy of voters with disabilities. It requires that electronic voting equipment provide mechanisms for vote-verification in a manner similar to, but other than, paper. The Department of Justice has declared that the requirement for a voter-verified audit trail, such as this, is compatible with the disability requirements of HAVA. H.R.2239 accelerates the HAVA provisions for disabled persons. accelerates by one year the requirement for compliance with accessibility requirements, and it adds several other provisions of benefit specifically to disabled voters.

* I thought HAVA already required a voter-verifiable paper ballot.

HAVA Section 301 (a)(2)(B) says:

(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.
(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to change the ballot or correct any error before the permanent paper record is produced.
(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

On first reading, this requirement seems to ensure that every voter can verify a paper record of his or her vote and that the verified records will be available for a manual recount. Some legislators seem to have intended this meaning and therefore thought that it was a HAVA requirement. Unfortunately, this audit requirement is widely interpreted
to mean the permanent record produced at the end-of-day, unverified by voters.

* * *

Here are additional links to stories and resources for you:

Guardian Independent/UK:
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1013-01.htm

New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/02/opinion/02KRUG.html

Book (in stores, but available online):
http://www.blackboxvoting.com

A BUZZFLASH READER COMMENTARY